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Price versus Quota Reductions:
U.S. Flue-Cured Tobacco Policy
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ABSTRACT
Declining domestic cigarette consumption, increased global competition, and loss of import
restrictions indicate decreased demand for U.S. flue-cured tobacco. The effects of 109ZO
declines in domestic and export demand are evaluated under a policy of reducing quota
to maintain price versus a policy of allowing price to fall to maintain quota. Changes in
prices, quantities, revenues, and economic rents are simulated. Losses to nonfarming quota
owners are minimized under a policy of price maintenance, while losses in revenues to
tobacco-producing areas are minimized by a policy of quota maintenance. Aggregate losses
to tobacco growers are greater under a policy of quota maintenance.
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Tobacco production is an economically im-
portant crop in the southeastern United States,
with gross farm revenues in recent years of
$2.8 to $3 billion (U.S. Department of Agri-
culture). The U.S. produces two major types
of cigarette tobacco: flue-cured and burley.
Gross revenues from sales of U.S. flue-cured
tobacco have ranged from $1.3 to more than
$1.5 billion in recent years. Flue-cured tobac-
co is produced in five southeastern states, with
North Carolina being the largest producer.
Since the 1930s, the flue-cured tobacco
program has held U.S. tobacco price above
free market levels by restricting supply, ini-
tially through acreage quotas and more re-
cently through marketing quotas. In addition,
because of quality differentiation, U.S. flue-
cured tobacco growers have enjoyed unprec-
edented pricing power in the world tobacco
market. The combination of this market power
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and the supply restrictions enforced by the to-
bacco program has effectively created a cartel
(Johnson and Norton). However, this pricing
power appears to be waning. In 1975, the U.S.
marketed 1.5 billion pounds of flue-cured to-
bacco. Twenty years later, the U.S. marketed
less than 900 million pounds of flue-cured to-
bacco. Still, this amount could not have been
sold at the prevailing support prices (which
had been reduced in 1986) except for severe
import limits and an agreement with U.S. cig-
arette manufacturers to purchase excess inven-
tories held by the grower-owned cooperative.
During this same period, U.S. cigarette pro-
duction has increased to record levels as world
cigarette consumption and demand for tobacco
have risen. Nevertheless, there has been an
overall decline in U.S. flue-cured mnrketings
which can be attributed to lower tobacco use
per cigarette, declining U.S. cigarette con-
sumption, and intense competition from rising
tobacco production and improved quality in
countries such as Brazil and Zimbabwe.
Tobacco state legislators, faced with a de-
clining marketing quota under the current446 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, December 1996
price support levels, organized an advisory
committee in early 1995 to consider policy op-
tions (Barnett). One important option consid-
ered was whether or not to lower price sup-
ports in an effort to slow or prevent further
erosion in the marketing quota.
The analysis presented in this study was
originally completed for the congressional ad-
visory committee. The study examines the ef-
fects of allowing market prices to fall by low-
ering price supports versus the effects of
maintaining the current price support levels
and allowing the marketing quota to decline.
Impacts on tobacco growers, nonproducing
quota owners, and total revenues to tobacco-
producing areas are evaluated. Following a
brief synopsis of the tobacco program, a mod-
el and economic parameters for evaluating the
policy changes outlined are presented, Empir-
ical results are then given, with policy impli-
cations discussed.
The U.S. Tobacco Program
Burley and flue-cured tobacco production are
controlled by similar, but distinct, government
programs. Although this analysis addresses
only flue-cured production, many of the find-
ings of this study are also applicable to burley,
Production and prices of burley and flue-cured
tobacco are controlled under the U.S. tobacco
program through a combination of price sup-
ports and marketing quotas. Price support lev-
els are determined by a weighted average of
changes in production costs and lagged market
prices. National marketing quotas are set each
year. The marketing quota is determined by
the sum of purchase intentions for the year in
question as announced by the domestic ciga-
rette manufacturers, a three-year average of
exports of tobacco, and an adjustment for in-
ventories held by the producer- and buyer-fi-
nanced tobacco cooperatives. The coopera-
tives purchase tobacco not bringing at least
one cent above the support price on the auc-
tion markets held for farmers’ tobacco each
season. Cooperative inventories above (below)
a predetermined level result in a negative (pos-
itive) adjustment in the formula for the next
year’s national quota.
While the price support formula includes
lagged market prices, the inclusion of produc-
tion costs combined with the fact that down-
ward movement in market prices is limited by
the price support structure means that price
supports are not very responsive when de-
mand decreases, However, the inclusion of do-
mestic purchase intentions and the adjustment
for cooperative inventories in the quota for-
mula makes the national marketing quota very
responsive to downward shifts in demand for
U.S. tobacco. Thus, in the case of declining
demand, it is reasonable to describe the tobac-
co program as maintaining price by shifting
supply via the marketing quota. Allowing
price, instead of quota, to fall can only be ac-
complished by lowering price supports
through legislative action.
The marketing quotas for U.S. tobacco
were initially divided among tobacco growers
based on production history. Over the years,
the quota has been dispersed among heirs of
tobacco farmers, nonproducers who purchased
farms with tobacco quota, and, of course, ac-
tive tobacco farmers who inherited or pur-
chased quota. Also, the quota can be rented or
sold under certain restrictions (Rucker, Thur-
man, and Sumner). As such, quota is an asset
with its own rental and sales market. The an-
nual rental value of the quota is the annual
cartel rent accruing from the tobacco program.
Flue-cured tobacco growers own about one-
third of the national flue-cured marketing quo-
ta (Clauson and Grise); the remainder is
owned by nonproducers who rent their quota
to growers. As will be shown, potential con-
flicts between the interests of nonproducing
quota owners and tobacco growers are very
important to the policy process.
The Model
A log-linear equilibrium displacement model
is developed to simulate changes in flue-cured
tobacco prices and quantities, and the resulting
changes in economic rents due to exogenous
changes in domestic or export demand for
flue-cured tobacco. A particular exogenous
change in demand is not identified since the
focus of the study is the supply policy re-Brown and Martin: U.S. Tobacco Policy 447
Table 1. Definitions of Endogenous and Exogenous Variables and Parameters
Symbol Definition Value
Endogenous Variables:
P Farm sales price of U.S. tobacco
Q. Quantity of U.S. flue-cured tobacco purchased by U.S. manufacturers
Q, Quantity of U.S. unmanufactured flue-cured tobacco exports
Q Total quantity of domestically produced flue-cured tobacco
R Total domestic flue-cured tobacco revenue
L Market rental rate for flue-cured tobacco quota
M Cartel rents accruing to flue-cured tobacco quota holders
s Producers’ surplus
Exogenous Variables:
ET~ Proportionate change in domestic demand for U.S. flue-cured tobacco due to
an exogenous demand shifter
ET, Proportionate change in export demand for U.S. flue-cured tobacco due to an
exogenous demand shifter
Parameters:
-0. Wholesale price elasticity of demand for cigarettes
ac U.S. tobacco share of domestic wholesale cigarette costs
‘fl~ Compensated elasticity of domestic demand for ftue-cured tobacco
% U.S. export price elasticity of demand for domestic tobacco
hd Quantity share of domestic tobacco used in U.S. cigarettes
E Domestic tobacco output response elasticity
a~ Average cost share of quota rent in tobacco production











sponse; thus, only negative shifts in demand
are considered. Such shifts in demand result
from, for example, increases in cigarette taxes,
increased smoking restrictions, changes in
trade policy, decreases in the price of foreign-
grown flue-cured tobacco, and increased qual-
ity of foreign-grown tobacco. The model is
presented below:
(1) EQd = q~EP + ET~,
where -q~= q$ + hcqC;
(2) EQ, = q.EP -t-ET.;
(3) EQ = ~dEQd + (1 – ~d)EQ,;
(4) EQ = lEP.
Here, the endogenous variables are propor-
tional changes in quantities and prices, and
exogenous variables are proportional changes
in demand shifters. Further definitions of vari-
ables and parameters are given in table 1. Sub-
stituting (1) and (2) into (3) and equating the
resulting equation with (4) to solve for EP
yields equation (5), which gives the propor-
tionate change in flue-cured tobacco price for
exogenous changes in domestic andlor export
demand:
(5) EP=ET+(c– q),
where ET = pdETd + (1 – pd)ET,, and ‘q =
M_b + (1 – (.3d)q,.Substituting EP from (5)
into (1) and (2) then gives the resulting pro-
portionate change in the amounts of flue-cured
tobacco used domestically and exported. Note
that as 6 approaches infinity, EP approaches
zero, i.e., the supply response given by the
current tobacco program. If e = O, then EQ =
O, and the demand shock is absorbed by EP.
Once EP and EQ have been calculated,
then proportionate changes in the economic
rents accruing to various participants in the to-
bacco program are calculated as follows:448 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, December 1996
(6) ER = EP + EQ,
(7) EL = (1/a)EP – [(1 – ci)/a]wEQ,
(8) Ekl = EL + EQ,
(9) ES = (1 + w)EQ.
Parameters
Parameters for the simulations, such as elas-
ticity estimates, and quantity and cost shares
are given in table 1. Demand and supply elas-
ticity estimates from prior studies are used in
the simulations. There are numerous estimates
of the elasticity of domestic demand for cig-
arettes (e.g., Becker, Grossman, and Murphy;
Chaloupka; Wasserman et al.), ranging from
–0.28 to –0.8. Brown (1995a) reported a re-
tail export elasticity of demand for U.S. cig-
arettes of – 0.84. However, the cost share of
tobacco is small, so that the effect of cigarette
price elasticity on the uncompensated price
elasticity of U.S. tobacco is very small. A
mid-range estimate, –0.6, of the retail ciga-
rette price elasticity is used. Assuming a con-
stant absolute margin with fixed input
proportions, this corresponds to a wholesale
cigarette price elasticity of – 0.4.
Beghin and Chang, using a static model,
estimated the compensated price elasticity of
domestic demand for U.S. tobacco to be
–0.9 1. Using a dynamic model to allow for
costs associated with adjusting stocks of to-
bacco and capital, Rezitis, Foster, and Brown
reported a long-run compensated price elastic-
ity of domestic demand for U.S. tobacco of
–0.34 for mean quantity and price for 1950
to 1993. Using the results of Rezitis, Foster,
and Brown, and mean quantity and price from
1991 to 1993 implies an elasticity of about
–0.45, This estimate is used since a dynamic
model should be a more accurate model of the
cigarette industry.
Few estimates of the uncompensated elas-
ticit y of export demand for U.S. tobacco exist.
Johnson and Norton reported an elasticity of
–2.33. However, since the 1983 Johnson and
Norton study, the export market share of the
U.S. has fallen and, according to industry rep-
resentatives, the quality of foreign-grown flue-
cured tobacco has improved. This implies that
the elasticity should now be larger. Conse-
quently, an export demand elasticity of – 3.0
is used in the simulations here.
A wide range of estimates of the elasticity
of the marginal cost of tobacco production can
be found. Goodwin and Sumner reported an
estimate of 0.25, while the results of Babcock
and Foster imply an estimate of about 0.08.
More recently, Fulginiti and Perrin reported a
supply elasticity for U.S. tobacco of 7.0, sug-
gesting an elasticity of marginal cost of 0.14.
The Fulginiti and Perrin estimate is used in the
simulations for this anal ysis. Given the range
of available elasticity estimates and the uncer-
tainty surrounding some of them, the sensitiv-
ity of the results to extremes in demand and
supply elasticities is examined.
Simulations
Two scenarios representing negative shocks to
U.S. tobacco demand are examined. First, the
case of a negative 10% shift in domestic de-
mand is considered. The source of the exog-
enous decline in demand is not identified, but
sources are easy to envision. Brown (1995a)
showed that a $0.45 per pack increase in cig-
arette taxes coupled with a 60% increase in
smoking restrictions could decrease domestic
demand for U.S. tobacco by 11%. Zaini, Be-
ghin, and Brown found that a domestic content
requirement, in place in 1994 for tobacco in
U.S.-produced cigarettes, shifted domestic de-
mand for U.S. tobacco out by about 10%. This
domestic content law was repealed in late
1995. As a result, domestic demand for U.S.
tobacco is expected to shift back by more than
870.
In the second scenario, the case of negative
10% shifts in both domestic and export de-
mand is considered. While no formal studies
exist, sources of such shifts are also easy to
envision. A decline in the price of foreign-
grown flue-cured tobacco, resulting from
changes in exchange rates or burgeoning sup-
plies, would induce negative shifts in both do-
mestic and export demand. Improvement in
the quality of foreign-grown flue-cured tobac-
co (as purported by leaf merchants and ciga-Brown and Martin: U.S. Tobacco Policy 449
Table 2. Proportionate Change for ETd = –O. 1, and ET, = O or –O. 1, Under Different Supply
Response Policies
E ET, EP EQ EQJ EQ< ER EL EM ES
02 0.00 0.00 –0.05 –0.10 0.00 –0.05 0.03 –0.02 –0.06
–0.10 0.00 –0.10 –0.10 –0.10 –0.10 0.06 –0.04 –0.11
1 0.00 –0.02 –0.02 –0.09 0.06 –0.04 –0.09 –0.11 –0.02
–0.10 –0.04 –0.04 –0.08 0.02 –0.08 –0.17 –0.21 –0.04
o 0.00 –0.03 0.00 –0.09 0.10 –0.03 –0.17 –0.17 0.00
–0.10 –0.06 0.00 –0.07 0.09 –0.06 –0.31 –0.31 0.00
rette manufacturers) could also induce nega-
tive shifts in both domestic and export demand
for U.S. flue-cured tobacco.
Proportionate and actual changes in price,
quantities, and rents to various constituent
groups for negative 10% shifts in domestic de-
mand, and both domestic and export demand,
are presented in tables 2 and 3, respectively.
Results are given for three supply response
policies: allowing quota to decline to maintain
price (i.e., l = ~); allowing price to decline to
maintain quota (i.e., l = O); and allowing price
and quota to decline by proportionately equal
amounts (i.e., ~ = 1). Relative to a negative
10% shift only in domestic demand, simulat-
ing a negative 10% shift in both domestic and
export demand slightly less than doubles the
impact on price, total quantity, and economic
rents. Obviously, the effect on domestic use
and unmanufactured exports is very dependent
on the market in which the shift in demand
occurs. Under the current program, the entire
shift in domestic demand is absorbed by a
change in total use. However, when price is
allowed to dampen the domestic shock, ex-
ports actually increase in response to the price
decrease, further cushioning the shock to total
quantity used. In the case where price absorbs
all the shock (~ = O), exports increase 10Yo,
while total quantity used only decreases 3?70.
In the cases where both domestic and export
demand decrease by 10~o, exports increase by
2V0 when e = 1, and by 9% when e = O.
Export and domestic use both decline by 10?io
when price is held constant (~ = w).
In the case of a 109o decline in both do-
mestic and export demand, total use of U.S.
flue-cured tobacco (Q), falls from 865 million
pounds to 778 million pounds under the cur-
rent program (table 3). For the case where
price absorbs all the demand decline, price
falls from $1.71 to $1.60 per pound for a 10%
decline in both domestic and export demand.
The effects of different supply response
policies on total farm sales of flue-cured to-
bacco are quite different. Under a policy of
maintaining price (~ = w), total revenues de-
cline by $148 million when both domestic and
export demand decline by 10YO.However, if
price is allowed to absorb the demand decline
(e = O), total revenues decline by only $92
million. Thus, if the policy goal is to minimize
the impact on rural tobacco economies, then a
policy of allowing price to decline in order to
maintain quota is best.
Why, then, are policy makers so reluctant
to reduce price supports, thereby allowing the
market price to decline instead of the quota?]
An examination of the change in economic
rents to tobacco program participants is very
informative in answering this question. The
change in economic rents accruing to nonpro-
ducing quota owners (those who do not grow
tobacco, but rent their quota to tobacco farm-
ers) is found by multiplying the change in car-
tel rents by the fraction of the national quota
owned by nonproducers. Under the current
policy of maintaining price and allowing quota
to fall, economic rents to nonproducing quota
holders fall by only $9 million (table 3) when
1The price supports of U.S. tobacco were reduced
in 1986. However, this decision was made only after
program costs escalated dramatically, exports plum-
meted, and inventories held by the grower cooperatives
climbed to near disastrous levels over several years.450 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, December 1996
Table 3. Price, Use, and Changes in Revenues and Economic Rents in Response to ETd =
–O. 1, and ET, = O or –O. 1, Under Different Supply Response Policies
Change in
Change in Nonproducing Change in
Price Tobacco Quota Owner Grower
per Pound Total Use Revenues Rents Rents
l ET, ($) (roil. lbs.) (roil. $) (roil. $) (roil. $)
m o 1.71’ 818 – 80 –5 –11
–0.1 1.71 778 –148 –9 –19
1 0 1.67 847 –61 – 23 –14
–0.1 1.64 832 –111 –43 –26
o 0 1.65 865b –50 –35 –16
–0,1 1.60 865 –92 –64 –30
‘Average weighted price for 1992, 1993, and 1994,
bAverage total use for 1992, 1993, and 1994.
both export and domestic demand fall by 10%.
However, under a policy of allowing price to
decline in order to maintain quota, economic
rents to nonproducing quota owners fall by
$64 million. Thus, if the policy goal is to max-
imize rents accruing to nonproducing quota
owners, then the appropriate policy is the cur-
rent program of price maintenance.
If the policy goal is to maximize the wel-
fare of tobacco growers, the question becomes
more complicated. The change in aggregate
rents accruing to tobacco growers is found by
multiplying the change in cartel rents by the
fraction of the national quota owned by grow-
ers and then adding this product to the change
in producers’ surplus. In aggregate, tobacco
growers, who own about 32% of the total flue-
cured quota (Clauson and Grise), incur a net
loss of $30 million with a policy of price re-
duction (table 3). Alternatively, under the cur-
rent policy of allowing quota to fall in order
to maintain price, growers incur an aggregate
net loss of only about $19 million. However,
among individual tobacco growers, the effects
from either a quota or price reduction are not
uniform. Brown (1995b) shows that the net
change in economic rents for a producer de-
pends on the proportion of quota rented versus
owned by the producer. In other words, it de-
pends on the extent to which the grower par-
ticipates in cartel rents. If the change in cartel
rents accruing to a grower more than offsets
the change in producer’s surplus to the grower,
then smaller losses will be incurred by the
grower under a policy of maintaining price by
allowing quota to decline (6 = w), rather than
a policy of price reduction (~ = O). However,
if a grower owns only a small share of the
quota produced, then smaller losses may be
incurred under a policy of price reduction
since the change in producer’s surplus offsets
the loss in cartel rents to that producer.
The tension between cartel rents and pro-
ducers’ surplus can be seen in table 2. Under
a policy of allowing quota to decline in order
to maintain price, the proportionate change in
cartel rents (Eikf) is – 0.04, whereas the pro-
portionate change in producers’ surplus (ES)
is —O.11 for a 10% decline in both domestic
and export demand. Conversely, under a pol-
icy of allowing price to decline in order to
maintain quota, the proportionate change in
cartel rents is –0.31, while the proportionate
change in producers’ surplus is zero. Quota
rental rates (L) actually rise under a policy of
maintaining price. However, the increase in
rental rates is not enough to completely offset
the loss due to a smaller quantity of quota to
be rented.
Finally, one other complexity must be
added to the analysis: the sensitivity of the
results to the demand and supply elasticities
used. How do the results change if elasticity
estimates of an extreme case of more elastic
demand (q$ = –0.91, qlg = –5) and more
inelastic supply (~ = 0.25) are used? First,Brown and Martin: U.S. Tobacco Policy 451
the conclusions concerning policy effects on
rural economies and nonproducing quota
owners do not change. With a negative 10%
shift in both domestic and export demand, to-
tal tobacco revenue declines $148 million un-
der the current policy of maintaining price,
but declines only $53 million under a policy
of allowing price to fall in order to maintain
quota. Economic rents to nonproducing quota
owners do not change in response to negative
10?ZO shifts in both domestic and export de-
mand under the current policy of price main-
tenance. Higher quota rental rates exactly off-
set fewer pounds of quota. Under a policy of
allowing price to fall instead of quota, non-
producing quota owners lose about $37 mil-
lion in rents. The results for aggregate grower
rents do change, however. The reduction in
aggregate grower rents is $27 million under
the current program, but only $17.5 million
under a program of allowing price to fall in
order to maintain quota. As before, the effects
of either policy are not uniform across grow-
ers, but assuming more elastic demand and
more inelastic supply elasticities implies that
a higher proportion of growers will benefit
from allowing price to fall in response to neg-
ative shifts in demand.
What about the other extreme of more in-
elastic demand (q~ = –0.45, -q,, = – 2.33) and
more elastic supply (p = 0.08)? Once again,
the conclusions about rural economies and
nonproducing quota owners do not change. In
response to negative 109i0 shifts in both do-
mestic and export demand, total tobacco rev-
enues decrease by $114 million under a policy
of allowing price to fall in order to maintain
quota, versus $148 million under the current
program. Nonproducing quota owners lose
$79 million in rents under a policy of allowing
price to fall, versus only $14 million under the
current policy of maintaining price. Aggregate
grower rents decrease $37 million under a pol-
icy of allowing price to fall, versus only $15
million under the current program. Under
these assumptions, a higher proportion of
growers would benefit from keeping the cur-
rent policy of maintaining price at the expense
of quota.
Concluding Remarks
The policy decision of how to respond to neg-
ative shifts in demand entails choosing be-
tween the interests of cartel participants and
rural economies. Nonproducing quota owners
would prefer a policy of maintaining price
supports; rural economies clearly fare better
under a policy of maintaining production. The
uncertainty and lack of uniformity in the ef-
fects of changes in price and quantity on to-
bacco growers further complicates the policy
decision. The change in aggregate grower
rents can be positive or negative depending on
the elasticity estimates used. Despite this am-
biguity, some growers fare better under a pol-
icy of price reduction, and others under a pol-
icy of quota reduction. The effects are not
uniform across growers.
One other factor adds to the complexity of
this matter. Under the current program, quota
automatically declines in a declining demand
scenario, while changes in the price support to
allow market prices to decline require legis-
lation. Some tobacco state legislators feel that
introducing any legislative changes to the to-
bacco program could give anti-tobacco legis-
lators an opportunity to eliminate the program
completely. Farm organizations involved in
tobacco policy continually look for ways to
induce positive shifts in U.S. tobacco demand
to avoid declines in either price or quota. Cur-
rent attempts to gain market access to China
for U.S. tobacco exports and the short-lived
domestic content law are examples of this ac-
tivity. However, the prospect of positive
changes in demand seems more uncertain than
the prospect of negative changes. Given these
factors (and barring program elimination by
anti-tobacco legislators), the outlook for U.S.
flue-cured tobacco seems to be one of status
quo—attempts to maintain price at the ex-
pense of declining marketing quotas.
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